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Time for Urging Objections to Jury Lists and
Venires: Article 202, Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure
Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 pro-
vides:
"All objections to the manner of selecting or drawing any
juror or juryor to any defect or irregularity that can be
pleaded against any array or venire must be filed, pleaded,
heard or urged before the expiration of the third judicial
day of the term for which said jury shall have been drawn,
or before entering upon the trial of the case if it be begun
sooner; otherwise, all such objections shall be considered as
waived and shall not afterwards be urged or heard."'
(Emphasis added.)
This article, apparently aimed at providing for prompt objec-
tions to jury lists or venires, has been a continuous source of
difficulty and confusion.2  The purpose of this comment is to
inquire into the correct interpretation of article 202, to discuss
its shortcomings, and to suggest possible legislation that would
clarify this area of criminal procedure.
Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 was
first interpreted as requiring a defendant to object to a jury list or
venire no later than the third judicial day of the term for which
the jury was drawn, counting from the beginning of the term.3
It was suggested that, where the accused had been indicted or
had allegedly committed a crime after the third day of the
jury term, article 202 would have no application,4 and that the
general articles governing the time for quashing indictments
1. LA. R.S. 15:202 (1950).
2. Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Procedure-A Critical Appraisal, 14 Lou-
ISIANA LAW REVIEW 11, 17 (1953); Comment, 18 TuL. L. REv. 462, 481 (1944).
3. State v. Smothers, 168 La. 1099, 123 So. 781 (1929).
4. Ibid.; for similar cases arising under prior statutes see State v. Taylor,
43 La. Ann. 1131, 10 So. 203 (1891); State v. Ashworth, 41 La. Ann. 683, 6
So. 556 (1889); State v. Vance, 31 La. Ann. 398, 399 (1879) ("We think that
section 11 of the act of 1877 must be held not to apply to juries drawn after
the first day of the term; nor to persons who had no interest and no right
to object to the venire until after the juries had been empaneled. It would
be to the last degree unjust to apply it to a person who is indicted during
the term for an offense committed after the first day of the term. );
State v. Texada, 19 La. Ann. 436 (1867).
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might apply.5 In State v. Wilson,6 however, this suggested inter-
pretation was not followed. In that case, the alleged crime was
committed and the indictment returned well after the expira-
tion of the third judicial day of the grand jury term. Before
trial, but forty-five days after the expiration of the grand jury
term,7 the defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment and
the entire jury panel and venire. The motion was denied as
not having been timely filed and the defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the defendant argued that since he could not pos-
sibly have complied with the terms of article 202 and objected
to the jury venire within the first three judicial days of the term,
article 202 should have had no application, and that his objec-
tions should have been allowed at any time prior to trial. Appar-
ently, the Supreme Court felt that article 202 should have gen-
eral application, but should not be so construed as to render it
unconstitutional.8 In affirming the conviction, the court stated
that an accused indicted for a crime must raise his objections
to any irregularity regarding the composition of or manner of
selecting any grand jury list or venire, before the expiration
of three judicial days after the expiration of the term of the
grand jury which returned the indictment, or before trial if it
be sooner.9 Thus the phrase "of the term" was in effect changed
to "after the term," thereby giving article 202 a strained con-
struction probably not intended by the legislature.10
In the very recent case of State v. Chianelli,11 this construc-
tion of article 202 was applied in sustaining an objection to the
5. State v. Gill, 186 La. 339, 172 So. 412 (1937); State v. Smothers, 168
La. 1099, 1104, 123 So. 781, 783 (1929) ("It seems, however, that Article 287,
Code Cr. Proc., might be invoked. ... ); cf. State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 74,
14 So.2d 873, 889 (1943), where Chief Justice O'Niell said in his dissent:
"Articles 253, 284, 286, and 287 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . . . have
reference to defects in an indictment not founded upon a defect or an
irregularity in the selecting or drawing of the venire."
6. 204 La. 24, 14 So.2d 873 (1943).
7. For articles governing length of grand jury terms, see LA. R.S. 15:180,
189, 200 (1950); see also The Louisiana Legislation of 1940, 3 LoUISIANA LAW
ReviEw 98, 164 (1940).
8. State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 50, 14 So.2d 873, 881 (1943) ("It must
be further remembered that under those circumstances the constitutionality
of Article 202 would be seriously involved, because the defendant would be
denied an opportunity to present such pleas and objections ... ").
9. State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 53, 14 So.2d 873, 882 (1943). This holding
was approved in State v. Labat, 75 So.2d 333 (La. 1954); State v. Michel, 225
La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207 (1954).
10. State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 74, 14 So.2d 873, 889 (1943) (Justice
O'Niell, dissenting, "[T]he construction which the trial judge has given to
the so-called 'third judicial day' rule, in this case, is not only contrary to
the wording of the statute-and contrary to the jurisprudence on the sub-
ject-but is in fact an impossible construction."
11, 76 So.2d 727 (La. 1954).
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petit jury venire. There the court noted that inasmuch as article
202 makes no distinction between petit and grand juries, the
"third judicial day after the expiration of the term" rule of the
Wilson case should apply to all juries. However, the court
reasoned that, since trial necessarily begins before the end of
the petit jury term, 2 article 202 merely requires an accused
to raise all objections to petit jury venires before trial.
The present interpretation of article 202, as established by
the Wilson case and applied to objections to petit jury venires
in the Chianelli case, is subject to criticism. This construction
in regard to objections to grand jury venires, fails to provide
for cases in which an accused is not assisted by counsel until on or
after the third judicial day after the expiration of the grand
jury term. Also, since objections to petit jury venires are per-
mitted until trial, in some instances an accused can substantially
delay the trial of his case by waiting until the date fixed for
trial to raise such objections. 13 Where the hearing necessary to
determine the validity of the defendant's objections continues
until the jury term has expired, the result is a postponement
of the trial until the next jury term.
The basic problem of statutory construction is one of ascer-
taining the intent of the legislature. In relation to article 202,
the generally applicable canons of statutory construction would
lead to a different conclusion from that announced in the Wilson
case. Thus, under the "plain meaning" rule or "rule of literal-
ness,"'14 it is difficult to say how the phrase "of the term" could
be construed as meaning "after the term." However, since a
literal interpretation would lead to the incongruous result of
depriving many accused persons of the right of objecting to
jury venires, the plain meaning of the language of the statute
should not be relied upon as conclusively proving the legisla-
tive intent.15 Because of the considerable amount of prior legis-
lation on this special subject, an examination of the legislative
12. For articles governing length of petit jury term, see LA. R.S. 15:181,
187, 195 (1950).
13. State v. Chianelli, 76 So.2d 727, 730 (La. 1954) ("We are conscious
of the fact that under the interpretation given o Article 202 by the Wilson
case and others following it an accused can indefinitely delay the trial of
his case.").
14. For a statement of the "plain meaning" rule, see Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662 (1889). *See
also 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4502 (1943).
15. Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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history 6 of article 202 provides a clearer indication of the legis-
lative intent underlying it.
The earliest Louisiana statute dealing with the time for
objecting to jury venires provided that "all or any objections...
shall be made on the first day of the term of said district court,
and not afterward.' 1 7 In subsequent acts, applicable in all the
parishes except Orleans, a similar "first day of the term" rule
was re-enacted.'8 In construing these statutes, the courts always
gave the phrase "of the term" its literal meaning. 9 Where it
would have been impossible for the defendant to raise these
objections on the first day of the term of court, the statutes were
considered inapplicable and objections were allowed at a later
time.20 Act 135 of 189821 extended the time for raising objections
to jury venires by permitting them at any time before trial.2 '
Concurrent with these statutes for the "country parishes," sepa-
rate statutes were in effect in Orleans Parish. The first of these
provided that such objections "must be urged within the first
three judicial days of the term.' 23  Subsequent re-enactments
employed substantially the same language.24 Although no case
arose under the Orleans Parish statutes which called for a
precise interpretation of the phrase "within the first three
judicial days of the term," the phrase "of the term" was com-
mon to both the statutes for the "country parishes" and those
for the Parish of Orleans and seemingly had a similar meaning
in both groups. Thus it logically follows that the uniform inter-
16. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See also 2
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5002 (1943).
17. La. Acts 1840, No. 32, § 5, p. 27, re-enacted in La. Acts 1855, No. 243,
§ 3, p. 297.
18. La. Acts 1877, No. 44, § 11, p. 55: "All objections to the manner of
drawing juries, or to any defect or irregularity that can be pleaded against
any array or venire, must be urged on the first day of the term, or all such
objections shall be considered waived, and shall not afterwards be urged."
La. Acts 1894, No. 89, § 10, p. 121; La. Acts 1896, No. 99, § 11, p. 144.
19. State v. Hebert, 50 La. Ann. 401, 23 So. 300 (1898); State v. Collins,
48 La. Ann. 1454, 1455, 21 So. 86 (1896) (motion to quash denied "upon the
ground that it came too late, not having been tendered and filed on the
first day of the term of court at which the grand jury was drawn and or-
ganized .... ").
20. See note 4 supra.
21. La. Acts 1898, No. 135, § 16, p. 216: "All objections to the manner
of selecting or drawing the jury or to any defect or irregularity that can
be pleaded against any array a venire must be urged before entering on
the trial of the case."
22. See State v. Jenkins, 160 La. 757, 107 So. 564 (1926); State v. Thomas,
141 La. 560, 75 So. 241 (1917); State v, Flint, 52 La. Ann. 62, 26 So. 913 (1899).
23. La. Acts 1894, No. 170, p. 211.
24. La. Acts 1921(E.S.), No. 114, § 2, p. 244; La. Acts 1926, No. 337, §
2, p. 652.
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pretation of the earlier statutes used in the "country parishes,"
giving the phrase "of the term" its literal meaning, 25 would
have been equally proper in the Orleans statutes.
Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928
abolished the distinction between the rule applicable in the
Parish of Orleans and that in the other parishes.20 The language
of the article, obviously patterned after the statutes previously
enacted for Orleans Parish,27 reflects the legislative approval
of the judicial interpretation of the prior statutes.28 It is sub-
mitted that the legislative history of article 202 indicates an
intent on the part of the legislature to limit the time in which
a defendant may object to jury venires to no later than the third
judicial day of the term for which the jury was drawn, counting
from the beginning of the term.
Under this interpretation, where a defendant is indicted
prior to the beginning of the criminal term of court in which
his case is assigned for trial, he is able to raise his objection
to the petit jury venire within the first three judicial days
of the term or before trial if it be begun sooner. However,
this rule would preclude the challenging of petit jury venires
where the fixing of the date of trial does not occur until after
the first three judicial days of that particular criminal term.
Also, when applied in the case of an objection to the validity
of a grand jury venire, this interpretation of article 202 would
normally be unworkable.2 9 It would be a rare occurrence indeed,
in which a grand jury could be empaneled, testimony examined,
and all or even a majority of its indictments returned, all within
the space of three judicial days from the beginning of the term.80
25. State v. Sterling, 41 La. Ann. 679, 6 So. 583 (1889); State v. Vance,
31 La. Ann. 398 (1879). See also State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 60, 14 So.2d
873, 885 (1943) (O'Niell, C. J., dissenting: "Heretofore this court has held
consistently that the expression 'before the expiration of the third judicial
day of the term for which said jury shall have been drawn' means before
the end of the third judicial day counting from the beginning of the term.").
26. See State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 65, 15 So.2d 873, 886 (1943) (appli-
cable to both "the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans as it is
to the District Courts in the other parishes.").
27. The phrasing of the Orleans Parish statutes (La. Acts 1921(E.S.),
No. 114, § 2, p. 244) is "[not] after the expiration of the third judicial day
of the term for which said jury shall have been drawn," and in article 202
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 it is "before the expiration of
the third judicial day of the term for which said jury shall have been
drawn, or before entering upon the trial of the case if it be begun sooner."
28. See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5109 (1943).
29. State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 49, 14 So.2d 873, 881 (1943) ("This would
mean that Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be rendered
absolutely nugatory .... ).
30. Of. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(b)(1), which provides that a defendant who
has been held to answer in the dictrict court awaiting grand jury action
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When any of these situations arise in which the literal inter-
pretation of article 202 would lead to incongruous results, the
court is faced with two possible courses of action. It might
follow the earlier jurisprudence and hold that since the law
does not require impossibilities, 31 the article does not apply to
cases in which the crime was committed or the indictment
found after the third judicial day of the term. The effect of
such a conclusion would render the article practically nugatory.
On the other hand, if the court were to apply the article to "all
objections to . . . any jury or to any defect or irregularity that
can be pleaded against any array or venire ' '32 (emphasis added)
as its literal meaning suggests, defendants would often be denied
an opportunity to challenge the legality of the jury list or
venire. Such an interpretation would render the constitution-
ality of the article extremely doubtful. 33
It is clear that under either the literal interpretation of
article 202 or that adopted in the Wilson case, certain undesirable
results are sure to follow. This somewhat anomalous situation
is the result of the legislative attempt to promulgate a single
rule that would govern the time for filing objections to both
petit and grand jury venires.34 Admittedly, the interpretation
established in the Wilson case seems to have fewer shortcom-
ings than the literal interpretation. However, it is submitted
that the court in the Wilson case was guilty of judicial legisla-
tion.3 5 Also, since the Supreme Court can at any time decide
that the rule of the Wilson case is illogical and revert to the
prior rule, an accused person is at the present somewhat inse-
cure in waiting until after the first three judicial days of the
term to raise objections to the jury venire. Possibly the only
solution lies in the amendment of article 202 by the legislature.36
The formulation of a rule which requires prompt objections
to jury venires without working a hardship in any case has been
most nearly achieved by the American Law Institute in its
may challenge the array of jurors. State v. Collins, 48 La. Ann. 1454, 21 So.
86 (1896) (defendant, who was held in jail at the beginning of grand jury
term, but not indicted until later, should have urged objections to grand
jury venire on first day of term).
31. See note 4 supra.
32. LA. R.S. 15:202 (1950).
33. See note 8 supra.
34. See Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Procedure-A Critical Appraisal, 14
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 11, 17 (1953).
35. See State v. Chianelli, 76 So.2d 727, 729 (La. 1954) ("judicial legisla-
tion rather than judicial interpretation").
36. State v. Chianelli, 76 So.2d 727, 730 (La. 1954) ("Article 202 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure requires legislative, not judicial, action.").
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Model Code of Criminal Procedure, 7 which treats challenges
to the petit juries and grand juries separately. As to grand
juries, it provides in effect that the latest time at which objec-
tions may be urged as of right to the grand jury panel or to
any individual grand juror is at arraignment. 3  Objections to
the petit jury panel or venire must be urged before any indi-
vidual juror is examined. 3 9
The Louisiana legislature, by following the example of the
Model Code and enacting one article setting forth the time for
objections to grand juries and a separate article dealing with
objections to petit juries, can eliminate the difficulties and
confusion caused by article 202.
The rule in regard to the time for objecting to grand jury
venires as stated in the Model Code of Criminal Procedure re-
quires slight changes in order to function most effectively under
existing Louisiana criminal procedures. Persons charged with
offenses are often arraigned and brought to trial a considerable
time after the expiration of the grand jury term, at which time
citizens who composed the grand jury venire are likely to be
unavailable for any hearing as to its validity. Therefore, the
provisions of the Model Code, allowing objections as of right
until arraignment, would be unsatisfactory. A workable article
might provide:
"All objections to the manner of selecting and drawing
any grand juror or to any defect or irregularity that can
be pleaded against any grand jury array or venire must be
urged before the expiration of the third judicial day after
the expiration of the term for which said jury shall have
been drawn; or before entering upon the trial of the case
if it be begun sooner; otherwise all such objections shall
be considered as waived and shall not afterwards be urged
or heard; provided, that in his sound discretion, the trial
judge may permit such objections to be raised up until trial
is begun. '40
The last clause is inserted to cover those cases in which an
37. A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930).
38. Id. § 207, providing in part: "Upon being arraigned the defendant
shall immediately, unless the court grants him further time, either move
to quash the indictment or information or plead thereto, or do both"); of.
FED. R. CraM. P. 6(b)(1), 6(b)(2) to the same effect.
39. A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 269 (1930).
40. Cf. rule announced in State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So.2d 333 (1954);
State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207 (1954); State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24,
14 So.2d 873 (1943).
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accused is provided with counsel at a very late date, that is,
after or immediately prior to the third judicial day after the
expiration of the term.41 This suggested legislation, which
allows all defendants a reasonable time in which to file objec-
tions to the grand jury venire, would not be open to an attack
on constitutional grounds.
In Louisiana, arraignment is the latest time at which many
motions in a criminal proceeding can be urged as of right.
42
However, since criminal cases are often assigned for trial before
a jury venire is selected,43 it follows that a rule requiring ob-
jections to petit jury venires to be made no later than arraign-
ment would be unsatisfactory. On the other hand, if a defen-
dant were allowed to raise such objections at any time prior
to trial, he could often substantially delay the trial of his case
by waiting until the date fixed for trial to urge the objection
which might necessitate a hearing on the validity of the petit
jury array or venire.44 Nevertheless, an accused should be given
ample time in which to raise objections to petit jury lists or
venires. In order to resolve this difficulty an article might be
enacted to provide:
"All objections to the manner of selecting and drawing or
to any defect or irregularity that can be pleaded against
any petit jury array or venire must be urged before the fifth
day prior to trial; otherwise such objections shall be con-
sidered as waived and shall not afterwards be urged or heard;
provided, that in his sound discretion, the trial judge may
permit such objections to be raised up until trial is begun."
In order to allow a defendant whose trial is scheduled for an
early day in the criminal term ample time in which to object
to the petit jury venire, a provision is inserted permitting the
trial judge to relax the five-day time limit. Such an article,
in providing a five-day period immediately prior to trial in which
a hearing on the defendant's objections to the jury venire could
41. See A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 207 (1930) and FED.
R. CRIm. P. 12(b) (3) which permit trial judge to extend time for objections.
42. LA. R.S. 15:284 (1950): "Every objection to any indictment shall be
taken by demurrer or by motion to quash such indictment, before the ar-
raignment; and every court before which any such objection shall be taken
for any formal defect, may, if it be thought necessary, cause the indict-
ment to be forthwith amended in such particular, and thereupon the trial
shall proceed as if no defect had appeared."
43. See, e.g., State v. Chianelli, 226 La. 552, 76 So.2d 727 (1954), where
arraignment was on June 22, 1953, and trial fixed for January 12, 1954.
44. See note 13 supra.
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be conducted, should prevent undue delays. The effect of this
article would be to require the timely fixing of cases for trial
so as to give the accused a reasonable time in which to object
to the petit jury venire before the fifth day prior to trial.
David M. Ellison, Jr.
Venue in Louisiana Criminal Cases under
Amended Article 13, Code of Criminal Procedure
The rule governing venue in criminal cases, that an accused
ordinarily must be tried in the locality where the crime was
committed, has its origin in the common law institution of trial
by jury. Under the rules of early English criminal procedure, the
jury was composed of the witnesses to the crime.
For the convenience of the forum and the witnesses, the trial
was held in the neighborhood where the crime was committed.
Later, when the jury became an "impartial weigher of the evi-
dence," not composed of the witnesses to the crime, the require-
ment of trial at the locus of the crime was continued.' The con-
tinuance of this requirement may be due to the factor of avail-
ability of witnesses and other considerations of trial convenience.
A strict application of the rule that trial must be in the county
where the crime was committed, however, has not always pro-
duced the best results. For this reason, most jurisdictions have
relaxed the rule by creating certain exceptions. 2 For example,
offenses committed within short, specified distances from a
county line can be tried in either county.3 Furthermore, a prose-
cution for larceny can be brought in any county into which the
stolen goods are carried.4 This exception to the rule has been
extended in some states to include other "continuing" crimes.5
1. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 367 (1947); PUTT-
KAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 156, n. 8 (1953).
2. 1 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 278 (1883): "A
rule which requires eighteen statutory exceptions, and such an evasion as
the last one mentioned in the case of theft [the continuing nature of the
crime]-the commonest of all offences-is obviously indefensible .... [A]ll
courts otherwise competent to try an offence should be competent to try it
irrespectively of the place where it was committed, the place of trial being
determined by the convenience of the court, the witnesses, and the person
accused. Of course, as a general rule, the county where the offence was
committed would be the most convenient for the purpose."
3. LA. R.S. 15:15 (1950); PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
159 (1953).
4. State v. McCoy, 42 La. Ann. 228, 7 So. 330 (1890); PUTTKAMMER, ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 157 (1953).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 786 (1872); S.D. REV. CODE § 4514 (1919).
1955]
